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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 13-2642 
 ___________ 
 
CHRISTINE MAYS; 
MARK MAYS, (h/w), 
                      Appellants 
v. 
 
GENERAL BINDING CORPORATION;  
JOHN DOES 1-5, (fictitious persons); 
ABC COMPANIES 1-5, (fictitious entities);  
JOHN DOES 6-10, (fictitious persons);  
ABC COMPANIES 6-10, (fictitious entities) 
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 1-11-cv-05836) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 30, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 After suffering an injury from a laminating machine, an elementary school teacher 
brought a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer General Binding Corporation 
(“GBC”).  The District Court granted GBC’s summary judgment motion.  For the 
foregoing reasons, we shall affirm the District Court’s order.  
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we recount only the essential facts.   
 On April 20, 2010, Christine Mays ( “Mays”), a teacher at Johnson Elementary 
School, was utilizing the school’s laminating machine that was manufactured and sold by 
GBC.  When Mays finished using the machine she turned the machine off with her right 
index finger and felt an electrical flow sensation from her finger through her arm to her 
shoulder.  As a result of this incident, Mays sustained a burn to her right index finger and 
reported a permanent loss of feeling in her right finger.  
 On August 17, 2011, Mays, joined by her husband Mark Mays (together 
“Appellants”),1 filed a complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, naming GBC and 
                                                 
1 Mark Mays joined Christine Mays as a plaintiff alleging that he “has been 
deprived of his wife’s support, society, services, advice, counsel, guidance and/or 
consortium” as a “direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants . . . .”  
(App. 88.) 
several unnamed persons and companies as Defendants.2  Defendants removed the matter 
to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey based on diversity of 
citizenship.  
 After discovery and the exchange of expert reports, GBC moved for summary 
judgment on all claims.  Appellants did not oppose the grant of summary judgment on 
their negligence and manufacturing defect claims.  The District Court granted GBC’s 
motion for summary judgment on Appellants’ design defect, failure to warn, and loss of 
consortium claims.  This timely appeal followed.3  
 
II. JURISDICTION  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III. ANALYSIS  
 This Court’s review of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Summary judgment is granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 
                                                 
2 After factual discovery Appellants had not moved to name these fictitious parties 
and therefore, the District Court dismissed the claims against these unnamed parties.  
(App. 4.)    
 
 
256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).  
  
A. Design Defect Claim  
 Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state whose law 
governs the action.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  Under New 
Jersey law, to succeed under a strict-liability design-defect theory, a plaintiff must 
generally prove that “(1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed when the 
product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect caused the injury to a 
reasonably foreseeable user.”  Jurado v. W. Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1317 (N.J. 
1993).  In a design defect case, a plaintiff who asserts that the product could have been 
designed more safely must “prove under a risk-utility analysis the existence of an 
alternative design that is both practical and feasible.”  Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 
A.2d 967, 980 (N.J. 1998). 
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
the design defect claim.  Specifically, Appellants claim that a reasonable jury could 
reasonably infer that an alternative design of the laminating machine existed which could 
have prevented or reduced the risk of suffering an electrostatic shock as a result of using 
the machine.  Appellants base this argument on the report of George Widas (“Widas 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Appellants do not appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their loss of 
consortium claim.   
Report”), which stated that alternative designs “were and are readily available.”  
(Appellants’ Br. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
 Appellants’ argument fails for several reasons.  First, as the District Court 
correctly assessed, the Widas Report was critically deficient.  While the report identified 
“designed-in features” – including well-grounded induction bars, ionization neutralizers, 
and web cleaners – as alternatives to the grounding technology already utilized by GBC, 
it offered no specifications on whether the suggested designed-in features were 
economically or practically feasible.  The report’s analysis was further undermined by the 
report provided by James Crabtree, GBC’s expert, documenting that none of the nine 
competing laminators examined incorporated the alternative design recommended by 
Widas.  (See App. 229 (“None of the reviewed laminators were found to contain 
induction bars, inductive neutralizers or active static neutralizers in their laminate/web 
handling paths.”).)  An alternative design lacking in specificity or a factual basis cannot 
support a cause of action for damages because tort law is not designed to accommodate 
claims that would absolutely minimize accidents.  See Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 
A.2d 620, 627 (N.J. 1996) (“An inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the 
mere fact that someone was injured.”).  
 On appeal, Appellants contend that the District Court should have conducted an in 
limine hearing, giving them an opportunity to address those concerns prior to granting 
summary judgment.  This argument is also unavailing.  While it is true that this Court has 
favored holding in limine hearings in making a reliability determination, Padillas v. 
Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 1999), reliability was not at issue here.  
 
 
Rather, the Widas Report was critically deficient to meet the burden imposed by New 
Jersey law for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment.  See Lewis, 715 A.2d at 980 (“A 
plaintiff must prove either that the product’s risks outweighed its utility or that the 
product could have been designed in an alternative manner so as to minimize or eliminate 
the risk of harm.”).  The District Court was not obligated to hold the record open when it 
was undisputed that the report was a “very detailed” one that was “full of details.”  (App. 
57, 58.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (stating that a party opposing summary judgment 
on the basis that additional discovery is warranted must “show[ ] by affidavit or 
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 
opposition”).    
 Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting GBC’s motion for summary 
judgment on the design defect claim.  
  
B. Failure to Warn Claim 
 Under New Jersey law, “[a] manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a 
product liability action only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended 
purpose because it . . . failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions . . . .”  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987).  
 In order to bring a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must initially establish that the 
defendant had a duty to warn.  James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898, 
908 (N.J. 1998).  To establish such a duty, she must satisfy “a very low threshold of proof 
in order to impute to a manufacturer sufficient knowledge to trigger the duty to provide a 
warning of the harmful effects of its product.”  Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 
719 (N.J. 1993).  In cases proceeding under a theory of strict liability, as here, knowledge 
of the harmful effects of a product will be imputed to a manufacturer on a showing that 
“knowledge of the defect existed within the relevant industry.”  Id.  
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding that there was insufficient 
evidence triggering a duty to warn, since the Court had observed that there could be a 
genuine dispute as to a material fact with regard to whether the discharge of static 
electricity could cause personal injury.   
 Appellants are conflating two distinct concepts.  The mere fact that static 
electricity could cause personal injury does not necessarily indicate that the industry was 
aware of the potential harm.  Indeed, the record was entirely devoid of a documented 
instance of a similar injury, forcing the District Court to conclude that the instant case 
was “an unprecedented sample-of-one incident.”  (App. 27.)  Under these factual 
circumstances, this Court cannot presuppose knowledge of the alleged hazard of the 
product.  See James, 714 A.2d at 908 (holding that duty to warn is triggered when 
“knowledge in the industry has been established”).  
 Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on 
Appellants’ failure to warn claim.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the District Court. 
